# GR-NEAM®


## Economic Update & Reaching for Yield

Presented To



State Compensation Insurance Fund
November 17, 2011
Open Session

#### **Economic Framework**



## **Secular Forces**


#### Secular Forces

√ Housing Imbalance

√ Structural Unemployment


✓ Deleveraging Process

### Years to Absorb Excess Housing




#### **House Prices**

#### **Case Schiller Home Price Index**



### **Unemployment This Cycle**

#### **Percent Job Losses in Post WWII Recessions**



Number of Months After Peak Employment http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/

### Structurally Unemployed

#### **Civilians Unemployed for 27 Weeks or More**



## Projected Unemployment Rates


#### **Projected Unemployment Rate at Various Job Growth Rates**

	2012	<u>2013</u>	<u>2014</u>	<u>2015</u>	<u>2016</u>
Assumed Monthly Job Growth					
100	9.4%	10.0%	10.4%	10.8%	11.5%
150	9.0%	9.2%	9.3%	9.3%	9.7%
200	8.6%	8.5%	8.1%	7.8%	7.8%
250	8.2%	7.7%	7.0%	6.4%	6.0%
300	7.8%	6.9%	5.9%	4.9%	4.2%

Post Recession Monthly Job Growth Average	12
Latest 12 Months	112
Last Month (September 2011)	103


#### Deleveraging Progress?

#### **US Total Debt (ex Financial) to GDP**



#### Federal Debt Accumulation

#### **Qtr/Qtr Growth in Federal Debt Outstanding (\$mm)**




## Eurozone

#### **Eurozone Crisis**

- Eurozone took center stage in the summer as Spain and Italy sovereign spreads moved out
- We continue to hold the view that Eurozone issues will end in a financial crisis involving one or more big countries
- Now approaching the end game with Germany allowing financial market pressure on weaker countries to gain leverage
- Final outcome is unpredictable, but financial market stress is likely

### Periphery Bond Yields

#### **Eurozone Periphery Bond Yields**




## Spain and Italy

#### 10 Year Government Bond Yields



#### **Eurozone Crisis**

#### **GDP Growth And Government Interest Cost**



#### **Eurozone Conclusions**

- Eurozone policymakers' responses so far dangerously slow
- Italy and Spain approaching unsustainable bond yields
- Stress spreading to banking systems sovereigns and banks are joined at the hip
- Markets may force resolution in a matter of months or less


## Conclusions

#### Investment Policy Conclusions - November 2011


- Latest economic data continue to show a weakening economic environment
- The Euro Zone debt situation will continue to dominate the capital market risk appetite. Another pickup in volatility is likely.
- Risk assets have bounced somewhat, primarily because they were extremely oversold, as the S&P500 shed ~17% in three weeks.
- Despite the weakness in developed economies and tighter credit policies in the EM, oil continues to trade at relatively high levels. This seems at odds with current fundamentals. Further correction in commodities prices seems plausible if not likely.
- While not our base case, odds of an economic contraction in the U.S. are rising and is virtually certain in the Euro Zone.

## **Appendix**

#### **General Economic Conditions**












### **Employment Conditions**













## **Housing Market Conditions**













#### Consumer











#### Inflation Environment











Reaching for Yield

## **US Treasury Yield History**



## Sovereign Yield History



#### The Issues


- Yields have disappeared in a world of paper money this was not supposed to happen.
- Very long time series appeared until recently to converge to a clear conclusion – paper money is subject to inflation.
- Excessive use of private borrowing has left developed economies more susceptible to shock.
- Government borrowing now attempting to lessen the shock.
- Implications for investing Should you be reaching for yield in this environment to maintain/enhance the income your portfolio generates?
  - Increase Credit Risk
  - Extend Duration

## Investing for Insurance Company Balance Sheets


- Duplicating that which competition is doing is the road to mediocrity and even danger.
- Current environment suggests taking more credit risk to maintain yields, but current spreads may not justify the risk.
- Short rates at virtually zero encourage longer duration eventually this will be a mistake.
- Good investing requires
  - Patience
  - Discipline
  - Opportunism Waiting for when we are paid for it
  - Maintain Dry Powder in this Environment

## **Increase Credit Risk**


## Increase Credit Risk



## Increase Credit Risk










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## Effect of QE1 and QE2 on Equity Market

Summer 2007 to QE1 commencement	-45%
QE1	+34%
Period between QE1 and QE2	-10%
QE2	+26%
Since QE2 ended	-15%
S&P Returns since 07 w/o QE	-58%
S&P Returns with QE	+68%

## S&P 500 and Corporate Financial Spreads (inverted)



## **Extend Duration**


## 10yr US Treasury Yield



## 10yr US Treasury Yield minus 2yr US Treasury Yield



## Greece, Ireland and Portugal Bond Yields



## Deficit and Debt to GDP

	2011 Deficit *	
Eurozone	4.3%	88%
UK	8.6%	84%
US	10.0%	98%

<sup>\*</sup> as a % of GDP

## Cash Flow Forecast

Flat Rate Scenario	Principal Returned			
Period	as % of Total Par	<b>Running Total</b>	<u> </u>	
2011	4.9%	4.9%	4	35% of principal is expected back over
2012	17.4%	22.3%		the next 2+ years
2013	13.3%	35.6%		affords the portfolio
2014	10.2%	45.8%		the ability to take advantage of higher
2015	7.6%	53.4%	4	rates
2016	8.7%	62.1%		
2017	8.1%	70.2%		
2018	6.1%	76.2%		
2019	4.7%	81.0%		
2020	3.9%	84.8%		
2021	5.3%	90.2%		
Total after 10 years	90.2%			